

Series I
Correspondence,
1932-1973

Box 4, Folder 8

May 13, 1952 -
July 31, 1952

May 13, 1952

Dear Bud:

It was my understanding, when I telephoned you some weeks ago, that you had completed the study of the Battle for Leyte Gulf. I have been awaiting your comments with interest so that I may incorporate them in our copy which we are preparing for publication in probably early Fall, as it takes that long to get it out of the Government Printing Office.

Captain Minter of Weather Central who is working up the weather for the charts and - by the way is doing a swell job - may find it necessary to have a copy of this study. I have suggested to him that, in view of the fact you have completed your reading, you might be willing to let him take your copy. However, I also advised him that should you need the book or should you have made changes in it which I should have here, he, Captain Minter, will not be allowed to have that copy.

The reason for offering him your copy is not only the fact that you say you are through with it, but that we have no other spare copy here which is not being used.

With best regards and with hopes that I will be hearing from you soon, I am,

Your old friend,

R.W. BATES.

Rear Admiral E.E. Yeomans, USN,
Room 4A684, Pentagon Building,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

May 13, 1952

Dear Rollo:

I think when I told you that you didn't have to rush through the Battle for Leyte Gulf draft which I sent, I erred, for I should like to hear from you now, if I can.

We are finishing up the Japanese side and I desire to meld the American and Japanese sides together as soon as I can. Normally I wouldn't care, but as I told you before my staff is being changed as of June and I must complete the book - that is the meat factors of the book - prior to 1 July. May I ask you to let me have the book back as soon as you can with your recommendations, if any?

Needless to say, I appreciate thoroughly your willingness to read my draft since it is time consuming. I also appreciate it because, having observed your reading of Savo Island, I know that you will do a fine job.

With very best regards to you and to Bill Callaghan, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R.W. BATES.

Rear Admiral R.E. Wilson, USN,
Room 1002, T-8 Building,
McLean Gardens,
39th & Newark, NW,
Washington, D.C.

1112

May 23, 1952

Dear Mr. Johnson:

I accept the dates of May 28th and 29th at Film Graphics, although I do not plan to leave here before the morning of the 28th. I should, therefore, be at Film Graphics somewhere around noon. I plan to depart in the evening of May 29th for Newport.

I appreciated both of your notes and in particular your letter of May 14th wherein you discussed some of your concepts.

Very frankly I am not anticipating any particular difficulties with you or Mr. Blair, but in view of the terrific mess with the Audio Productions over Midway where the producer and the manufacturer felt they knew more about my book than I did, I must ensure that there is no repetition.

I want you to know that in this whole thing I am extremely friendly and open to variations within limits, but as I told Captain Ruddy, I cannot permit changes in the format of the book.

Looking forward to seeing you, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES.

Mr. Garrett I. Johnson,
U.S. Naval Photographic Center,
Naval Air Station,
Anacostia 20, D.C.

1113

June 2, 1952

Dear Mr. Cassidy:

With reference to the pay for Mr. Kawakami should you sign him up as a GS-12, I feel that that is a matter which you know how to handle much better than I do. Mr. Kawakami stated in his letter to me that he would prefer to remain on contract as he now is and would accept gladly the same rate of pay that he has now. In other words, it is not the money so much as the prestige that he seems to be concerned with. He appears to feel that if he gets a rating less than a GS-12 it will prejudice him in your eyes as well as other eyes elsewhere.

Mr. Kawakami is not an ordinary translator. He has a very excellent knowledge of Japanese and understands quite well what went on in the Japanese war on the Japanese side. He now has to review my draft of the Japanese side of this battle, which at the present time is some 277 pages. He has to review this to be sure that what is stated is correct and in accordance with the Japanese data available. He is not receiving it to challenge the strategy and tactics. That is my problem and mine alone.

Mr. Kawakami is of the opinion that this translation job should expire in about six months. I do not believe this for not only do we have the translations to do of the reports of many Japanese ships which have not as yet been translated but also we are getting six rolls of microfilm from Tokyo which will have to be scanned and translated where pertinent. Mr. Kawakami has the responsibility for scanning this material and deciding whether or not it is pertinent and what should be translated.

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From the above you can see that he is a quite superior fellow and I feel that if our Japanese write-up is correct it will be in a large part due to him. He is extremely punctilious and accurate and surprisingly without bias.

I should appreciate hearing from you as to your plans in this matter.

With many thanks to you for your help, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES.

Mr. B.J. Cassidy,
Head, Civilian Personnel Branch,
OP-281,
Room 4D488, Pentagon Building,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

1115

June 2, 1952

Dear Rollo:

Thank you very much for your return of my manuscript, for your comments thereon, and for the devoted time you took to read it so carefully. I am returning you, enclosed herewith, your personal comments. All of them, except the item "on page 24 second paragraph," are clear to me. I have had others read the paragraph to which you refer, and no answer can be found, so it seems quite possible that you have indicated the wrong paragraph.

We have a considerable amount of Allied intelligence and can not find, as yet, anything which would indicate how the Palau searches happened to be set up as they were. We went over that very carefully at the time to ensure that our comments were right and all references were carefully searched. I did not think that the method of making these searches, that is the barrier searches from Palau to protect TF 38 on October 8th, 9th and 11th, had been prescribed by Commander THIRD Fleet. Instead I thought and I still think that these searches had been ordered by CTG 30.5 - Fleet Air Wing One, and were his idea of solving the problem. Commander THIRD Fleet merely ordered CTG 30.5 to "intercept and destroy enemy search aircraft in vicinity of TF 38."

As regards the comment about dawn air searches preceding carrier strikes, I thoroughly concur with your views that it is often unwise to launch such an air search lest the air search give the surprise factor away.

That situation did not apply at Okinawa, however, because you launched your air strikes there at dawn. I commented that you should have launched your air searches at the same time. Had this been done the air strikes would have hit Okinawa, which was but 110 miles away, long before your search planes had reached the outer limit of search, and further, if the enemy had carrier task forces nearer than 110 miles wouldn't it have been well to have discovered this before such carrier task forces could catch CTF 38 by surprise? Of course it is true that some small Japanese craft might have picked up one of your search planes before the strike hit OKINAWA but this same danger also applied to the air strikes which could have been expected to be picked up by radar at 60-70 miles so the surprise factor was necessarily small. Actually TF 38's fighter sweep was picked up by enemy radar at 0630 which was only ten minutes before the attack commenced.

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As a matter of fact the Japanese, as it turned out, well knew that you were in the area and had been alerted long before you arrived. This is being mentioned merely as hindsight, but it shows that a commander in endeavoring to decide whether or not to make a search must remember that the enemy also has sources of intelligence which may be as good as his. When you read the Japanese side of this report you may be somewhat startled to discover how much information they actually had.

I hope that when you come up here I will have a chance to see you because I wish to change many of the "must haves" or "should haves" to "did." In other words, I want to put in here what Admiral Halsey, Mick Carney and you actually thought rather than what I think you thought.

You will be interested to learn that I have had to guess the Japanese side to a considerable extent because some of the data was destroyed. Every now and then I get new information concerning matters on which I have already written. To date this new information has completely supported what I had written. This is certainly gratifying.

With best regards, I am,

Your old friend,

R.W. BATES.

Encl: Personal Comments concerning Battle for Leyte Gulf manuscript.

Rear Admiral R.E. Wilson, USN,
Deputy Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service,
Room 1002, T-8 Building,
McLean Gardens,
39th & Newark, NW,
Washington, D.C.

1117

June 2, 1952

Dear Captain Winter:

I have returned on board after several weeks wandering about the Country on extraneous matters, and the first thing that hit my eye was the work which you had done on these diagrams of the Battle for Leyte Gulf.

The work is excellent. We are highly gratified at the outcome. I feel that without your personal attention and intervention we would not have accomplished any where nearly so much as we now have accomplished.

There is one difficulty with the zip-a-tone material which you used to indicate various characteristics of weather. Unfortunately we are unable to read the data underneath certain of your zip-a-tone markings. I therefore plan to copy exactly what you have given us and then to replace your zip-a-tone marking with lighter zip-a-tone.

For that reason I am writing to ask you if you can make available to us a certain amount of zip-a-tone paper as follows:

36 sheets No. 4
10 sheets No. 18
10 sheets No. 33
20 sheets T-D

For your information we plan to order some of this stuff ourselves, but we have, in the past, had such a terrific time to obtain this that I am afraid months will go by before we are adequately supplied.

If you will supply us with this material we will replace it with ours when we get it, if your ^{so} desire. Captain

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Dimitrijevic is also writing you about this, I think.

With best regards and with many, many thanks for an outstanding job, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES.

Captain R.O. Winter, USN,
OP-533,
Room 5E609, Pentagon Building,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

1119

June 2, 1952

Dear Captain Ruddy:

You will be glad to learn that our conferences in New York with your Mr. Johnson and Mr. Blair of Film Graphics have been very successful indeed. Film Graphics is doing well with the "story board" and Mr. Blair is very enthusiastic. He said, "this is a wonderful way to start making one of these films."

I think that Mr. Johnson and Mr. Blair make a fine combination in this work. Therefore, I hope that you will permit Mr. Johnson to be at Film Graphics as often as he desires. He is very clever as an artist, and I am sure, if I can keep him from trying to change the wording too much, that he will be very helpful indeed. His only serious weakness is that he is so anxious to make a good picture that he is liable to try to change the wording or the grouping of the paragraphs so that the "thought processes," which the film is suppose to present, are likely to be lost.

I am extremely glad that we have him with us and I thank you for providing him. I am planning to follow this "story board" closely so that I may ensure that the "thought processes" are adequately portrayed.

With best regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES.

Captain J.A. Ruddy, USN,
Commanding Officer,
Naval Photographic Center,
Naval Air Station,
Anacostia, D.C.

1120

June 3, 1952

Dear Captain Hobbs:

I am acting as technical advisor on a film of the Battle of Savo Island.

The question has arisen as to whether Tulagi and Gavutu Islands are to be considered as part of Florida Island or whether they are independent islands of the Ngela Group, and should be referred to as close to Florida Island. This latter is my choice, but is it correct?

Can you advise me by return mail as to the status of these islands?

I am asking you this since the matter is far from clear in either the pilot books or the charts.

Very sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES,
Commodore, USN (Ret).

Captain A. Hobbs, USN,
Hydrographer, U.S. Navy,
Hydrographic Office,
Washington 25, D.C.

June 4, 1952

Dear Admiral Kinkaid:

I am now completing the background of the operations for the Battle for Leyte Gulf. It is very long and covers about 600 double spaced typewritten pages. Strange as it may seem, the background operations have very little to do with the operations of the forces under your command, but are almost entirely concerned with (a) the operations of the 3rd Fleet against Okinawa, Formosa and the Philippines, (b) the operations of CinCPac and 7th Fleet submarines and (c) the Japanese counter actions. I have had the 7th Fleet submarine operations reviewed by Admiral Tichenor, who was the Chief of Staff to Admiral Christie, and in part by Admiral Christie himself. Admiral Tichenor came up here to consult with me and was extremely complimentary of my analysis of the 7th Fleet submarine operations.

The point that I am interested in now is with relation to the movement of the Philippine Attack Force (TF 77) to Leyte. I am particularly interested as to the correctness of my discussion of the manner in which you arrived at the decision made on October 15th to continue on to Leyte, in light of the fact that Commander 3rd Fleet had announced that he would be unable to provide fast carrier force support for the King II operation. That matter is discussed on pages 93, 93a and 93b. I am therefore sending you these pages with a request that, if you have time, you will read these few pages and will advise as to the correctness of the analysis.

With best regards and with hopes that your present assignment in high command in the Government is to your liking, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

Encl: Pages 88 to 93c incl.

R.W. BATES.

Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, USN,
2134 R Street, NW,
Washington, D.C.

Telephone: Dectr 4121.

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CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

June 4, 1952

Dear Mr. Blair:

I thought our meeting, as I told you in your car, was highly successful and I have written to Captain Ruddy, who is the Head of the Naval Photographic Center, to advise him to that effect. I also asked Captain Ruddy, in this letter, to make it possible for Mr. Johnson to be with you more frequently as he could be of help to you.

I want to be sure in drawing this Story Board that we maintain the principles that we enumerated, viz: That this film is not primarily a narrative of the Battle of Savo Island, but is instead a film of the problems and situations which face a commander in battle and the thought processes through which he goes in order to achieve his objectives. That is, the film is designed to show how the commander arrives at his decisions and to indicate whether or not the decisions are good or bad.

My fear is that there is still a tendency to consider this a narrative and to waste time with relatively unimportant matters when everything should be oriented towards the command decisions. In other words, all the arguments, for example, about Gavutu, Tulagi and Florida Island are not vital, and I don't think it wise to waste time on them.

However, I will answer some of the problems on that line if it will help at all.

Tulagi, for the present, is to be considered as an island separate from Florida Island and will be referred to as close to Florida Island. In the meanwhile I am asking the Hydrographic Office for a clearer statement of this.

I am at loss, at the present moment, to know why you desire Admiral Crutchley's orders and I am therefore not planning to send them. Next time I am in New York I will discuss this matter with you and if you need amplification I will provide

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you with whatever is necessary.

Because of the questions in Mr. Johnson's mind, I have rewritten the script for page 28 and am forwarding herewith a corrected copy. I have also changed the "book" to conform. The corrected book page number 56 is also forwarded herewith. Please place it in your copy.

I should prefer that the Hepburn Report not be included in this film unless it is necessary. I had the page photographed, but it suddenly dawned on me that it is "secret" and I therefore hesitate to have it included in a confidential film.

Thank you for driving me to the Airport. I appreciated it very much and it was most pleasant.

With best regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES.

Encls: Page 56, BatSavIs Manuscript
Page 28, BatSavIs Script

Mr. Lee Blair,
Film Graphics,
245 W. 55th Street,
New York, N.Y.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

1124

June 16, 1952

Dear Mr. Blair:

I am forwarding herewith pictures of four of the Admirals who were connected somehow with the Savo Island operation.

As you know, Yamamoto was the overall commander; Mikawa commanded the cruiser force; Yamada the 5th Base Air Force; and Matsuyama Commander Cruiser Division EIGHTEEN.

This ought to help greatly in drawing the pictures of the commanders to indicate the thought process and who is doing it.

I think that it would be well that if you would get together with Mr. Johnson and arrange a meeting next week. I will be going to California right after the 4th of July for three weeks and it seems well to have a meeting before then. If after talking to Mr. Johnson you will call me and give me several alternative dates for next week, I will advise you the one I am able to accept.

With best regards and hopes that you are progressing well with your story board, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

Encl: 4 photos of above
Jap Admirals.

R.W. BATES.

Mr. Lee Blair,
Film Graphics,
245 W. 55th Street,
New York, N.Y.

1125

June 16, 1952

My dear Mr. White:

I am writing to thank you and the governing committee of the Newport Reading Room for their thoughtfulness in extending the privileges of the Reading Room to the guests of the Naval War College during the Global Strategy Discussions.

The guests appreciated your interest in their welfare very much indeed and I am sure that by this gesture of good fellowship you contributed in a larger way than one would believe towards the success of the Global Strategy Discussions.

The Newport Reading Room has always had an emotional appeal to the many naval officers who have visited it throughout the years, but I do not believe that this appeal has ever been higher than at present.

May I thank you again for your continued assistance to me and to the Naval War College?

Very sincerely yours,

R.L. CONOLLY,
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy,
President.

Mr. Gustave J.S. White,
President,
Newport Reading Room,
Newport, R.I.

WRITTEN BY: Como R.W. Bates

1126

June 24, 1952

Dear Mr. Blair:

I will arrive in New York Thursday evening at 1835 (DST) and will remain at the New York Yacht Club. I plan to leave New York on the 1610 (DST) plane Friday, so I hope that you can arrange to have the review started on time, 0900, in order that I may get to the airport in time to catch that plane.

With best regards and with hopes that I am not putting too much pressure on you, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES.

Mr. Lee Blair,
Film Graphics,
245 W. 55th Street,
New York, N.Y.

1127

June 24, 1952

Dear Captain Minter:

Thank you very much for your letter of June 19th.

We have been having similar trouble with our zip-a-tone up here. However, we have now sent a dispatch calling the matter urgent and believe we will have our zip-a-tone almost immediately. So, if you have not done so already, please forget the whole thing.

Once again, thanks for the chart work on the weather, it is swell!

With best regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES.

Captain R.O. Minter, USN,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
OpNav 533,
Room 5E-609, Pentagon Building,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

1128

June 25, 1952

Dear Bud:

Thank you very much for your letter.

Naturally there are different schools in the study of operations at sea. Quite obviously I belong to a school which believes that there are occasions when submarines must support fleet operations directly. As you point out many submarine officers agree with this view. I am thoroughly in accord with the view that when nations have large merchant fleets and require these merchant fleets for survival the destruction of these fleets is of paramount importance. Such was the case of the Island Empire of Japan. Submarine activities in the Western Pacific were, in general, very successful and the conduct of the commanding officers superior. However this study is not concerned with the overall activities of the submarines throughout the war, but relates to their disposition and accomplishments in the Battle for Leyte Gulf. Here I have endeavored to point out that in many cases since they were to cover and support forces in SoWesPac, the dispositions of the submarines were incorrect.

I had hoped that you would write me something concerning the writeup on the submarines which I might have placed in the book to cover some of the points to which you refer.

If you will note, I have taken no stand concerning whether the submarines should have been under Admiral Halsey or remain under CinCPac. Perhaps later on in later volumes I might think it wise to take a stand, but at present the data on hand is not sufficiently conclusive.

If you disagree with Admiral Tichenor, it would be interesting to know in what way. It of course could be that the mental attitude in SoWesPac was different from that in CinCPac. SoWesPac submarines may have been somewhat of a nuisance to Commander Submarines Pacific since he had to supply SoWesPac with POA submarines.

You need not stop Helen's allotment!

With best regards, I am,

Your old friend,

RAdm E.E. Yeomans, USN,
Room 4B713, Pentagon Bldg.,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

R.W. BATES.

1129

July 3, 1952

Dear Chick:

I guess it is useless to say that I was surprised when I received your recent letter concerning my translators because, being an old sailor and planner, I never allow myself to be surprised. To be very honest I had anticipated that the loss of either Mr. Kawakami or Mrs. Tanaka would probably occur. I will say, however, that I am disappointed because both of them have been very valuable to me.

The whole situation came up, in part, because of an error in my office and, in part, because of an error in your's. We estimated here that we would be through translating before this time, but new information has been discovered and translation is a little slower than anticipated because some of the Japanese stuff is almost illegible and has to be blown up. Also, Mr. Kawakami, in indicating that translations would be completed earlier than estimated, erred in believing that all we needed were top command translations. This is absolutely untrue and I have very carefully, in the past few months, endeavored to straighten him out on this. I have found, on both the American side and the Japanese side, that the correct story is contained, in many cases, in the reports of the juniors. I have often found dispatches in the War Diaries or Action Reports of juniors which are missing, for reasons unknown, in the high command reports. In this connection a great deal of valuable information on the Japanese side has been obtained from the reports of the destroyer commanders. I think that the Japanese succeeded in destroying certain high level information and, in so doing, forgot that the information might well be available in the reports of the lower levels.

We can get on with but one translator, if we have to, although properly we should have two as between them they produce translations which are far better than anything I have seen heretofore and produce it faster.

1130

I am going to California on leave, departing on July 9th and will be gone about three weeks. My mother is in the hospital seriously ill and has been that way some months.

One of your former assistants, and need I say admirer, Captain Jim Mills, a Naval Aviator on the Staff of the War College, is flying me down on July 8th. I shall see you at about noon, I hope, on that day and then I will talk to Mrs. Tanaka and Mr. Kawakami and let them decide which one is to remain, if it is still necessary that one go.

I recognize that your decision in this matter, what ever it will finally be, is a command decision and we in the chain of command must comply.

I appreciate what you and "Germany" Curtis have done in this matter for me, and am only sorry that we could not have had better luck. As the French say, "C'est la vie!"

I may ask you if I may speak to Mrs. Rosenberg as sometimes things like this have unexpected results. Perhaps she will give me a "body."

Outside of all of this, I sympathize with you thoroughly over the heat of Washington. I hope that you are not finding it too bad. Newport is wonderfully cool.

With very best regards, I am,

Your old friend,

R.W. BATES.

Rear Admiral Charles C. Hartman, USN,
OPNAV,
Room 4E474, PENTAGON Building,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

16 July 1952

Captain Joseph J. Rochefort
Naval War College
Newport, R.I.

Dear Joe:

I hope things are going well with the editing for the "Battle for the Leyte Gulf". I know that it will be well done and I am gratified that you and the staff are working so hard on it. If, in the editing, you can see some place where we can present some of the Jap side in support of comments made on the American side, it would be helpful. So if you will ask your staff to keep an eye open for that it will save time.

I hope that the Kawikami issue has been settled. It has always been a pain in the neck, but this time I hope we can forget it for at least one year.

I told Admiral Fyfe, Admiral Curtis and Admiral Duncan that our first volume would be out this fall! Everybody was delighted.

I hope Captain Eccles has shown up to read the first volume. If he hasn't shown up I wish you would call him and tell him that his services are needed. I told Captain Eccles that I wanted his opinion as to whether to write "Battle Lessons" or not. At the present time I still feel that my original idea - no "Battle Lessons" should obtain for this volume. I think it well however, to collect "Battle Lessons" for the final volume - probably the third volume.

I hope Mr. Kawikami's most recent translations have arrived. I looked at them in Washington and saw nothing particularly new. So our volume is all right on that score.

However I am thinking seriously of making a slight modification on the 16th which modification will give two possibilities in the mind of the Chief Staff rather than the one I gave there.

The weather here is swell and I am doing my best to get in shape. I was really tired when I got here. Give my best to everyone and particularly to your beloved wife. Best regards,

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. Bates

1132

16 July 1952

RADM Wallace Beakley
Naval War College
Newport, R.I.

Dear Beak:

I arrived safely in California after a delightful trip via a FLOGWINGPAC plane. The VR-1 planes only make about 200 miles per hour compared to the VR-3's which make about 300. So I look forward to a return hop via a VR-3 plane.

I wrote you a note from Washington after my conversation with Admiral Duncan. I hope that you could read my writing. Since the Club pen was not very good I am reiterating here what we discussed:

1. WAR COLLEGE TRIPS: Admiral Duncan asked me whether I thought it wise to have the students at the War College make trips around the world during the college year. Evidently the National War College and the Armed Forces Staff College are making such trips. I told Admiral Duncan that I didn't feel qualified to speak for the War College and requested that I be excused. Admiral Duncan said no! that he wanted my personal opinion. In the presence of VADM Fyfe I said that I thoroughly disapproved of such trips. I gave as the reason the fact that the 10 months course was insufficient to learn what one had to learn, and that a trip of that kind would disrupt the course. Admiral Duncan said that he thoroughly agreed with me; that that was his idea exactly. So that is where we sit now.

2. SELECTION BOARDS - Admiral Duncan wished to know what I thought about Selection Boards being composed of so many VADM's. I told him that I favored it. He wished to know why. I replied that in my mind there would be more confidence among those being considered with many "Stars" on the board than with lesser rank. I said further that 7 VADM's was, I thought, a very fair set up. Admiral Duncan said that the reason he had decided on the 7 VADM's was exactly the reason I gave, and indicated that he was quite pleased with my answer.

We talked about numerous other things, notably Admiral Fechteler's health which we all agreed was excellent. I told Admiral Duncan that I remonstrated with Admiral Sherman because Admiral Sherman had too many details in his hands and I had also remonstrated with some of the deputy CNO's. Evidently no one had had any effect on Admiral Sherman and he had died. I said further that we hope that Admiral Fechteler wasn't going to die and that judging from his appearance, unless he had some internal worry,

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16 July 1952

which wasn't noticeable, he would be around for a long time. By the way, Admiral Fechteler arrived here a day or so ago, but I didn't see him. This was, moreover, my own choosing.

I told Admiral Fyfe and Admiral Duncan as well as other Admirals, that my first volume of "Battle for Leyte Gulf" was practically finished and would be out late this fall or early this winter. They were very pleased.

My leave is fine. I am doing nothing but relaxing under the Old Apple Tree and my weight is gradually going down.

I am dictating this letter in Captain Bond's office. Captain Bond is a graduate of our War College, and was a head of department for Correspondence when he was detached to this assignment. He is extremely proud of the War College and says that our reputation is increasing daily and strongly, and that everyone wants the Naval War College in preference to any other college. In fact, one of his officers has just been ordered to the War College for a course in Logistics, which gratifies the officers here as they have told me.

I hope this letter finds you in very good health, and that Mrs. Beakley is at least as well as might be expected. Warmest regards. I am, as ever,

Very Sincerely Yours,

R. W. Bates

1134

24 July 1952

Captain J. J. Rochefort
Naval War College
Newport, R.I.

Dear Joe:

Thanks for your letter. It was exactly what I expected.

I am planning to return on 31 July. This was my original plan and I have now been invited to fly on a very fast plane which is overwhelming in its pressure on me not to miss it.

I regret the heat is so terrific - at least the papers say it is.

I go to the Bohemian Grove tomorrow.

Give my best to everyone and to your family. Best regards.

Very Sincerely Yours,

R. W. Bates

1135

July 31, 1952

Dear Chick:

I hope you don't think that I have been rude in failing to reply to your very kind letter of July 10th relating to Mr. Kawakami. However, you have reason to think so since three weeks have elapsed since you wrote.

Actually, I have been away in California on leave and only returned today. My mother is quite ill in the hospital and I fear that she may never get out of the hospital, although, believe it or not, she has been there one year. Her improvement, if any, has been very little.

I appreciate your kindness in handling this matter and I appreciate Captain Stuart's help. Anyone that knows me knows that I do not hold anyone that I don't need and on occasions loan my own enlisted staff if for some reason there is but limited need of them at the time.

We are trying to get all we can out of Mr. Kawakami and I am sure that by the end of the fiscal year we will be through with one, if not both of them.

I hope things have been going well with you. Washington, I know, has been extremely hot and heat is not conducive to best work. I think that educators and psychiatrists say that the best temperature for the brain is around 40°F and, for the body, around 60°F. Therefore the temperatures around 90°F you are at present experiencing are necessarily bad.

California was swell! Temperatures averaged about 65°F. Even the earthquake in no way affected my mental attitude since it was slight in the San Francisco area.

With best regards and many, many thanks for your thoughtfulness, I am,

Your old friend,

R.W. BATES

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